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Abstract. In human societies the probability of strategy adoption from a given person may be affected by
the personal features. Now we investigate how an artificially imposed restricted ability to reproduce, over-
ruling ones fitness, affects an evolutionary process. For this purpose we employ the evolutionary prisoner’s
dilemma game on different complex graphs. Reproduction restrictions can have a facilitative effect on the
evolution of cooperation that sets in irrespective of particularities of the interaction network. Indeed, an
appropriate fraction of less fertile individuals may lead to full supremacy of cooperators where otherwise
defection would be widespread. By studying cooperation levels within the group of individuals having
full reproduction capabilities, we reveal that the recent mechanism for the promotion of cooperation is
conceptually similar to the one reported previously for scale-free networks. Our results suggest that the
diversity in the reproduction capability, related to inherently different attitudes of individuals, can enforce
the emergence of cooperative behavior among selfish competitors.
PACS. 02.50.Le Decision theory and game theory – 89.75.Fb Structures and organization in complex
systems
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is a successful paradigm for
studying interactions among individuals as different as
bacteria [1] and humans [2]. One branch of game theory
considers the problem of cooperation as a particular ex-
ample of such interactions. The conflict between the in-
dividual and common interests is frequently modeled by
the so-called prisoner’s dilemma game [3]. Originally the
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game consists of two players who have to decide simulta-
neously whether they want to cooperate or defect. Mutual
cooperation yields the highest collective benefit shared
equally between the players. However, a defector can have
a higher individual payoff if the opponent decides to co-
operate. Therefore both players decide to defect, whereby
they end up with a lower payoff than if both would co-
operate; hence the dilemma. This unfavorable result of
classical game theory is, however, often at odds with real-
ity [4]. Accordingly, several mechanisms, ranging from kin-
selection to various forms of reciprocity [5] and other more
sophisticated processes [6], have been proposed to explain
the emergence of cooperation. Particularly inspiring in the
latter aspect, and still widely investigated, is also the spa-
tial extension of the classical prisoner’s dilemma game [7,
8,9] as well as other games with different payoff rankings
[10]. Although the outcome of so-called games on grids de-
pends somewhat on their numerical implementation [11],
the cooperation-facilitating effect in the context of the
prisoner’s dilemma game is robust.
The success of the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
to sustain cooperation has made it a common starting
point for further explorations of mechanisms that could
facilitate cooperation even beyond the borders determined
solely by the spatial extension. For example, it proved very
successful to introduce a third strategy into the game.
The so-called loners, or volunteers, induce a rock-scissors-
paper-type cyclic dominance of the three strategies [12]
and are able to prevent, via oscillatory changes, the ex-
tinction of cooperators even by high temptations to defect
[13,14]. Noteworthy, the loners also promote cooperation
in the absence of spatial interactions. Moreover, the im-
pact of variable degrees of investment in the prisoner’s
dilemma game has also been studied, as was the suitable
walk of agents on the grid [15], as well as fine-tuning of
noise and uncertainties by strategy adoptions [16,17,18].
To exceed the simplest lattice graphs, more specific
topologies of networks defining the interactions among
individuals were also studied [19,20], which has received
substantial attention (for a review see [21]). More specifi-
cally, the celebrated scale-free graph has been recognized
as an extremely potent promoter of cooperative behav-
ior in the prisoner’s dilemma as well as in the snowdrift
game [22,23], and this promotion of cooperation has been
found robust on several factors [24]. However, one may ar-
gue that the many links of a hub involve not just a higher
payoff but a higher cost as well. Therefore, the use of nor-
malized payoffs may represent a more realistic approach
[25]. Indeed, the introduction of participation costs eradi-
cates the ability of scale-free networks to promote cooper-
ation [26], yielding similar levels of cooperative behavior
as regular grids introduced initially by Nowak and May [7].
Very recently, Pacheco et al. have reported that a suitable
dynamical linking helps to maintain cooperative behavior
[27,28], whereas on the other hand, Ohtsuki et al. have
shown that the separation of the interaction and strat-
egy adoption graphs completely disables the survival of
cooperators if the overlap between the two graph is zero
[29,30]. Inhomogeneities in the strategy adoption proba-
bilities can also enhance the frequency of cooperators [31,
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32], particularly if the strategy adoption is favored from
some distinguished players [33]. It is worth mentioning
that the introduction of other inhomogeneities in the per-
sonality (e.g., stochastic payoffs [34], different aspiration
levels for the win-stay-lose-sift strategies [35], or even in-
dividual acceptance levels for the evolutionary Ultimatum
games [36]) can also support the altruistic behavior under
certain conditions.
In this paper, we extend the above investigations by
introducing the diversity of reproduction of individuals on
two types of complex networks; namely on regular small-
world graphs and on highly irregular scale-free networks.
To study the impact of the diversity of reproduction on the
stationary level of cooperation explicitly, we focus on nor-
malized payoffs by the prisoner’s dilemma game. We find
that the differences of reproduction facilitate cooperative
behavior irrespective of the interaction network and par-
ticularities concerning payoff accumulation, and moreover,
may lead to domination of cooperation where otherwise
defection would reign. Remarkably, although normalized
payoffs can eliminate the advantage of scale-free topol-
ogy, we observe that reproduction restrictions of players
that are inversely proportional to their connectivity re-
store the cooperative trait across the whole parameter
range of the temptation to defect. By studying cooper-
ation levels within the group of individuals having full re-
production capabilities, and comparing those to the over-
all fraction of cooperators, we are able to draw strong
parallels between the presented mechanism for the pro-
motion of cooperation and the one reported previously for
scale-free networks. Indeed, our results imply that several
recently introduced mechanisms for the promotion of co-
operation within the prisoner’s dilemma game are routed
in diversities of participating players, which may emerge
intrinsically due to an inhomogeneous interaction network
[23], or can be introduced extrinsically via social diversity
[37] or reproduction restrictions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 is devoted to the description of particularities of
the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game and reproduc-
tion restrictions on small-world and scale-free networks,
while Section 3 features the results. In the last Section we
outline potential implications of our findings.
2 Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game
We consider an evolutionary two-strategy prisoner’s dilemma
game with players located on vertices of either regular
small-world graphs or irregular scale-free networks. Via
the analogy with the creation of the Watts-Strogatz struc-
ture, the former graph is generated from a regular two-
dimensional grid by randomly rewiring a certain fraction
Q of nearest-neighbor links whereby preserving the initial
connectivity zx = 4 of each player x [38]. Evidently, for
Q = 0 this structure is a square lattice, whereas the limit
Q→ 1 yields a regular random graph. The scale-free net-
work is generated via the celebrated mechanism of prefer-
ential attachment growth [39] yielding a power-law distri-
bution of zx but still having average connectivity z = 4.
Initially, each player x is designated as a cooperator (C)
or defector (D) with equal probability. Moreover, amongst
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all N players, and irrespective of their initial strategies, a
fraction ν of players is chosen randomly and designated as
having a restricted ability to transfer their strategy [33].
The parameter ν is crucial in the present work since it
determines the fraction of players having restricted repro-
duction capabilities, and accordingly, will be in the focus
of simulation results presented in the following Section.
Importantly, the reproduction ability of each player is set
only once at the beginning of each simulation and remains
unchanged during the evolutionary process. Next, a player
y can reproduce its strategy sy on one of its randomly
chosen neighbors x (throughout this work ”neighbors of
y” refers to those which are directly connected with y) in
accordance with the probability
W (sx ← sy) =Wy
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/K]
, (1)
where Wy = w < 1 if player y has a restricted ability
to transfer its strategy, and Wy = 1 otherwise. Note that
the choice of w = 0 in the former case would mean that
νN players amongst all N are completely unable to re-
produce their own strategy, which would lead to frozen
states and stop the evolutionary process for large enough
ν. It is also easy to see that the stationary state at ν = 0
agrees with the state at ν = 1 but the relaxation is slower
in the latter case. Moreover, K characterizes the uncer-
tainty related to the reproduction process, also serving
to avoid trapped conditions and warranting smooth tran-
sitions towards stationary states. Payoffs Px and Py of
both players are calculated in accordance with the stan-
dard prisoner’s dilemma scheme [7] having temptation b,
reward 1, and both punishment as well as the suckers pay-
off 0, where 1 < b ≤ 2 to ensure a proper payoff ranking.
More precisely, both players x and y play one round of
the prisoner’s dilemma game with all their neighbors, re-
spectively. Their accumulated payoffs resulting from zx
and zy interactions are stored in px and py. As mentioned
above, these payoffs are normalized with the number of in-
teractions from which they were obtained, hence yielding
Px = px/zx and Py = py/zy. Using normalized payoffs we
can separate effects described earlier by Santos et al. [22,
23] from those appearing due to the presently introduced
reproduction restrictions.
The elementary steps of the game on the two consid-
ered types of complex networks are as follows. An arbitrar-
ily chosen player x acquires its payoff Px by playing the
game with all its neighbors. One randomly chosen neigh-
bor of player x; we denote it by y, also acquires its payoff
Py by playing the game with all its neighbors. Finally,
the reproduction of player y to the site of player x is at-
tempted according to Eq. (1). A full Monte Carlo step
(MCS) consists of executing the above-described elemen-
tary steps N times. Simulations of the evolutionary pro-
cess via the Monte Carlo algorithm were performed for
populations comprising N = 105 − 106 players, and char-
acteristic quantities, such as the stationary frequencies of
cooperators ρc and defectors ρd, were averaged over a sam-
pling period (ts = 10
4−106 MCS) after a sufficiently long
transient time tr ≈ ts.
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3 Results
The above described mechanism as a type of inhomoge-
neous teaching activity in a social context has proved to
promote cooperation on lattices [33]. Here we extend this
study to explore the possible role of the topological fea-
tures of complex graphs. To have an overview of the im-
pact of restricted reproducibility on a regular small-world
graph we calculated ρc systematically for different values
of Q and ν while the values of K and b were held fixed.
A typical contour plot of cooperation is plotted in Fig. 1,
where K = 0.08 and b = 1.14 were used. Within a wide
region of ν the level of cooperation (ρc) is enhanced sig-
nificantly and this improvement increases monotonously
with the randomness of the interaction topology via Q.
In particular, the fraction of cooperation can be enhanced
from ρc = 0 (for ν = 0 and Q = 0) to ρc ≈ 0.45 if
ν = 0.6 and Q > 0.5. The cooperation level saturates if
the rewiring probability exceeds the value Q ≈ 0.5. Notice
that the optimal value of ν is practically independent of
Q (νopt ≈ 0.6).
The Monte Carlo simulations show that reproduction
restrictions expand and shift the region of parameters for
which the cooperator and defector strategies coexist. We
emphasize that defectors can die out completely (ρc = 1)
below a threshold value of b, whereby the latter depends
on Q, K, ν and w. Figure 2(a) demonstrates the effect of
ν on the fraction of cooperators on a regular small-world
structure for Q = 0.1. Notably, for sufficiently low values
of w there exists a central region of ν for which ρc = 1.
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Fig. 1. Gray scale coded fraction of cooperators ρc in depen-
dence on Q and ν, obtained for K = 0.08 and b = 1.14. The
gray scale is linear, white depicting 0.0 and black 0.45 values
of ρc.
For larger values of w this region disappears and one can
only observe a peak in the contour of ρc(ν).
To extend the studied class of connection topologies
we have also analyzed the effect of reproduction restric-
tions on the maintenance of cooperation for the strongly
degree-inhomogeneous Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network
[39]. Figure 2(b) shows that the fraction of cooperators
remains fairly low for b = 1.04 if ν = 0. However, as soon
as ν is increased the fraction of cooperators rises quickly,
eventually reaching ρc = 1 at ν ≈ 0.5. Noteworthy, the
optimal fraction of players suffering under reproduction
restrictions on the scale-free network is comparable to the
one identified for regular small-world networks. The simi-
larity of behavior on these networks is related to the usage
of normalized payoffs that suppress the otherwise impor-
tant role of hubs by the scale-free connectivity structure
[25,40].
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Fig. 2. Fraction ρc of cooperators when varying ν: (left) on the
regular small-world graph generated with Q = 0.1 for K = 0.4
and b = 1.02; (right) on the scale-free network for K = 0.1 and
b = 1.04.
Since an appropriately pronounced limitation of repro-
duction capabilities recovers the ability of scale-free net-
works to boost cooperation to dominance even if normal-
ized payoffs are used in Eq. (1), it seems reasonable to in-
vestigate this phenomenon more precisely in dependence
on b, and moreover, to test if there exist optimal ways
of how reproduction restrictions can be introduced. Ac-
cordingly, the results presented in Fig. 3 compare ρc as a
function of b for four different cases of reproduction restric-
tions. In the absence of reproduction restrictions (ν = 0)
the scale-free network alone is unable to sustain cooper-
ative behavior past b = 1.09 since normalized payoffs are
used for the evaluation of fitness. On the other hand, the
region of coexisting D and C strategies is shifted towards
significantly higher values of b; in particular, cooperators
can survive up to b = 1.26 if ν ≈ 0.5.
Utilizing that scale-free networks have a power-law
connectivity distribution, it is reasonable to investigate
what happens if the reproduction capability of players is
proportional to their degree zy. For this purpose we have
studied a system with site-dependent w, i.e. wy = zy/zmax
where zmax is the maximal number of neighbors within
the employed scale-free network for ν = 1. These types
of dynamical rules describe the situation when strategy
adoption along each connection (in both direction) is al-
lowed with the same probability. The dashed-dotted line
in Fig. 3 illustrates that in this case cooperators survive
throughout the whole range of b. The advance of players
with large neighborhoods can be enhanced further either
by comparing total payoffs [22] or by artificial preferences
as suggested previously by Ren et al. [41]. To demonstrate
the additional enhancement the dotted line in Fig. 3 shows
the values of ρc on scale-free networks when the players
compare their absolute payoffs, as implemented in [22].
From the qualitative similarity between the last two cases
one can suspect that similar mechanisms may underlie the
enhancement of cooperative behavior for these systems. In
order to clarify this assumption, we have studied the level
of cooperation within the group of individuals having high
reproduction capabilities, denoting this as ρr, that can be
compared to the overall fraction of cooperators ρc. Evi-
dently, the players with w = 1 belong to the mentioned
group in the case of randomly distributed players with
two possible values of reproduction capabilities. However,
when the reproduction capability is inversely proportional
to the degree of a node several different values of w are
possible. Here we divide the nodes into three categories
in such a way that each interval of the degree becomes
equally large on the logarithmic scale. We consider play-
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Fig. 3. Fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of b when ν = 0
(solid line), ν = 0.5 (dashed line), and when the reproduction
restriction is proportional to the connectivity of each player
(dashed-dotted line) if K = 0.1 The highest ρc is achieved for
the model suggested by [22] (dotted line).
ers belonging to the ”high reproduction capability class”
if they are members of the highest connectivity group.
Results in Fig. 4 illustrate the difference ∆ρ = ρr − ρc
as a function of ρc for the small-world graph and scale-
free network at ν = 0.5, as well as for the case when
reproduction restrictions are proportional to the connec-
tivity of each individual (for comparative purposes results
obtained with absolute payoffs and in the absence of re-
production restrictions on the scale-free network are also
shown). In the latter case, and similarly to the inversely
proportional restriction situation, players of the studied
group have a connectivity belonging to the top third of
the whole interval on a logarithmic scale.
The most important message of Fig. 4 is that ∆ρ > 0
in the whole region of parameters. In other words, the
cooperation is preferred on the sites from where the ac-
tual strategy can spread away faster independently of the
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Fig. 4. Excess fraction of cooperators ∆ρ within the group
of individuals having high reproduction capability (or connec-
tivity) versus the overall fraction ρc. The four curves (from
bottom to top) illustrate the results obtained on the scale-free
network with randomly distributed two-value reproduction ca-
pability (solid line), small-world network (Q = 0.9) with ran-
domly distributed two-value reproduction capability (dashed
line), scale-free network with reproduction rate proportional to
the connectivity of each player (dashed-dotted line), and scale-
free network with absolute payoffs as in [22] (dotted line). The
simulation were performed for ν = 0.5 and K = 0.1.
mechanism yielding this process. Evidently, for pure co-
operation (ρc = 1) or defection (ρc = 0) ∆ρ = 0. In the
close vicinity of the boundaries the enhancement vanishes
linearly, i.e., ∆ρ ≃ ρc if ρc << 1 and ∆ρ ≃ (1 − ρc) if
1− ρc << 1. Between these two limits, however, values of
∆ρ indicate the enhancement of cooperation level within
the group of individuals having high reproduction capa-
bilities.
The above results indicate that defection cannot sur-
vive long on network sites having high strategy reproduc-
tion capability. This phenomenon is analogous to the one
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reported by Santos et al. on the scale-free graph [23]. In
the latter case the total payoff difference determines the
probability of strategy adoption that favors the sites with
a high degree. Consequently, within the large neighbor-
hood of a defector the fraction of defectors increases with
time, and this process yields a monotonously decreasing
total income for the focal defector. Sooner or later this
focal defector will adopt the strategy from another focal
cooperator whose imitation is beneficial for it, thereby, the
focal cooperators become the players to be followed by
others. In the present models a similar process takes place
due to the introduction of inhomogeneous reproduction
capabilities as an additional feature of players. Finally, we
mention that the recently introduced promotion of coop-
eration via social diversity in the prisoner’s dilemma game
[37] also relies on a mechanism with the same properties
as described above, hence implying it is widely applicable
and may serve to identify new ways of avoiding widespread
defection.
The above-described mechanism for the promotion of
cooperation assumes that links between players having a
large probability to affect their neighbor’s strategy are
rare [23,42]. Most notable enhancements of ρc are war-
ranted by the scale-free topology, which first, provides
extremely high inhomogeneities in the strategy adoption
probabilities, and second, yields practically unidirectional
strategy adoptions between players having large and small
connectivity. We have to emphasize, however, that on reg-
ular graphs the randomly distributed influential players
(players with full reproduction ability) are connected to
each other with an adequate probability only if their den-
sity is appropriately adjusted, i.e. neither too large nor too
small. Despite this necessary condition, however, the sim-
ulations have indicated some increase in ρc even if their
density was very low or high, respectively.
4 Summary
We have studied the effect of inhomogeneous reproduc-
tion capabilities on the evolution of cooperation for the
multi-agent evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game if the
connectivity structure is described by different complex
graphs, such as regular small-world graphs and strongly
irregular scale-free networks. Our results suggest that the
introduction of inhomogeneous reproduction capabilities,
representing many realistic situations in human societies
and animal communities, is a powerful and robust pro-
moter of cooperative behavior that works irrespective of
the complexity of the interaction network and other de-
tails concerning payoff accumulation and determination of
fitness. Diversity in reproduction capability is a particu-
larly potent promoter of cooperation if the connectivity
structure ensures that many co-players follow the strat-
egy of rarely linked but potent players as it happens on
the scale-free graphs studied by Santos et al. [22,23].
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Fund (T-47003) and the Slovenian Research Agency (grant Z1-
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